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Introduction
While rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distribu-11 tions are quite interesting, basic issues such as existence and uniqueness of a 12 pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) have been addressed only partially.
13
Indeed, previous work on the issue of existence focused either on symmetric 14 contests (Fey, 2008; Ryvkin, 2010) or on the case of a continuous technol-15 ogy (Wasser, 2013a (Wasser, , 2013b . Moreover, little general was known about the 16 uniqueness of the equilibrium.
17
Below, it is shown that in any rent-seeking contest with independent and 18 continuous types, there exists a unique PSNE. 1 The result holds even when 19 the contest is ex-ante asymmetric, 2 so that the equilibrium may entail in-20 active types. 3 Moreover, no restriction is imposed on the shape of the type 
24
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 25 set-up. Existence is dealt with in Section 3. Section 4 discusses uniqueness.
26
A numerical illustration can be found in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. An
27
Appendix contains technical lemmas.
28
1 Uniqueness means here that for any given player, any two PSNE strategies di¤er at most on a null set. This corresponds to the strongest form of uniqueness for PSNE. 2 Asymmetry may be re ‡ected, e.g., in heterogeneous distributions of marginal costs or in heterogeneous economies of scale.
3 Wärneryd (2003) explicitly allows for inactive types in a common-value setting. As usual, a simple change of variables allows to capture other types of contest success functions and other forms of uncertainty, e.g., about valuations. Cf. Ryvkin (2010) . 5 As shown in the Appendix, this amounts to the standard de…nition. 
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provided that y i c i = y i > 0. Hence, for su¢ ciently large, the cross- 
95
where
Integrating over D i , and subsequently summing over 
For " small, however, this is 99 impossible.
100
The following is the …rst main result of this paper. in an essential way for at least two players.
116
Lemma 4.1 There are players i 6 = j such that each of the independent 117 events i (c i ) 6 = i (c i ) and j (c j ) 6 = j (c j ) has positive probability. i (c i ) = i (c i ) with probability one, which is a contradiction.
121
The following is the second main result of this paper. 
135
An application of the chain rule delivers 
139
One can verify, however, that
for any (y 1 ; :::; y N ) 2 R N + nf0g and any (z 1 ; ::: 
any i = 1; :::; N , and any b i 2 S i .
164
Proof. Let be a PSNE, and consider a deviation b i 2 S i for some
166
Integrating over D i , the assertion follows via Fubini's theorem. Conversely, 
